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A SOLUTION TO THE HARD PROBLEM OF
SOFT LAW
Keagan Potts*

Administrative Agencies often rely on guidance documents to carry out their
statutory mandate. Over the past few decades, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has been criticized for using soft law guidance documents to exercise powers beyond those
authorized by Congress. Since attacks on the use of guidance documents persist and agencies
need soft law to respond quickly and flexibly to rapid technological growth, it is essential to
develop a solution that preserves this crucial regulatory mechanism and prevents its abuse.
The most likely alternative to soft law guidance is formal regulation, which must be developed
through the notice-and-comment process. The delays introduced by these formal processes,
however, leave innovators uncertain about how to comply in the interim, which slows
innovation. Alternatively, agencies may turn toward even less formal mechanisms, which are
less expensive. However, these informal mechanisms also present problems, namely vagueness,
contradictory rulings, and regulatory accumulation. This Note focuses on how courts can curb
the abuse of guidance documents and avoid the pitfalls associated with these two alternatives.
This Note identifies the ends of FDA regulation, the various mechanisms the FDA
uses to achieve these ends, and the Agency’s and regulated entities’ attitudes toward guidance
documents. Courts may either treat notice-and-comment rulemaking as necessary to finality
and refuse merits review or classify such documents as final and conduct a merits review.
This Note endorses the latter solution because it helps courts preserve agency discretion,
principally limits discretion, and incentivizes uniformity and predictability. This solution is
limited to documents that are practically binding on the agency.
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INTRODUCTION
Agencies are increasingly relying on guidance documents to carry out their
statutory mandate.1 The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is the most prolific
of the federal agencies when it comes to soft law guidance.2 The FDA and its
predecessors have utilized guidance documents for over a century.3 However, it was
not until the 1990s that the Agency’s increased responsibilities and ever-scarce
resources led it to use guidance documents as the primary method of policymaking.4
The FDA uses soft law to solve both narrow technical problems and to set broad,
important policies.5 While the FDA has made clear that these documents do not have
the full force of law, they are nevertheless effective in shaping regulated parties’
behavior.6 Over the past few decades the FDA has been criticized for using soft law
guidance documents to exercise powers beyond those authorized by congress.7 As
attacks on the FDA’s use of guidance documents mount, it becomes increasingly
important to develop a process that preserves this crucial regulatory mechanism while
preventing its abuse.
The FDA commonly justifies its increased reliance on soft law by citing the
need to respond quickly and flexibly to rapid technological growth.8 The FDA can
1.
Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., An Inventory of Federal Agency Guidance Documents, FORBES (Mar. 20,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2018/03/20/an-inventory-of-federal-agency-guidancedocuments/#4aa6f5ec5447.
2.
Ryan Hagemann et al., Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging
Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 37, 47 (2018); Lars Noah, Guidance Gone
Wild?: FDA’s Regrettable Retreat from Legislative Rulemaking, 30 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, no. 2, Oct.
9, 2015, at 1, 2.
3.

K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidelines and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 509 (2011).

4.

Id. at 520.

5.

Noah, supra note 2, at 2.

6.
Lewis, supra note 3, at 510; Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to
Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 167–68 (2019).
7.
Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of
Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 875 (1997).
8.
See generally Scott Gottlieb, FDA’s Comprehensive Effort to Advance New Innovations: Initiatives
to Modernize for Innovation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/fda-voices/fdas-comprehensive-effort-advance-new-innovations-initiatives-modernize-innovation
(contemplating an increased role of guidance to spur innovation while ensuring safety and efficacy); Lars
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react to attacks on its use of guidance either by implementing more formal
mechanisms or by using more informal techniques. While the agency insists that the
most likely alternative to guidance is formal regulation, the procedural requirements
for formal rulemaking substantially delay the implementation of regulations.9 During
the prolonged notice-and-comment process, innovators are left uncertain about how
to comply, which slows innovation. This dearth of regulatory oversight also risks
harming the public by delaying the entry of helpful technologies.10 The availability
of faster, more responsive alternatives to rulemaking is essential to promoting
innovation through effective regulations.11
Instead of embracing formal rulemaking, FDA may respond to efforts to
limit their use of soft law by moving toward even less formal mechanisms (e.g. case
by case adjudication, and internal management documents).12 The FDA, like many
other agencies, selects informal mechanisms because formal rulemaking continues to
be the more expensive route.13 However, mechanisms that are even less formal than
guidance documents also present problems. For instance, case-by-case adjudication
is “by its very nature vague and contradictory.”14 Additionally, enforcement manuals,
another informal mechanism, that the FDA provides its enforcement personnel to
guide their behavior may escape judicial scrutiny.15 Increased reliance on these kinds
of informal actions would make it harder for industry to know how to comply with
regulatory requirements. Excessive reliance on informal mechanisms could also
contribute to regulatory accumulation, which occurs when “thebuildup of more and
more regulatory restrictionsdistorts and deters the business investments that drive
innovation and economic growth.”16 Regulatory accumulations increase uncertainty
as industry struggles to determine whether the FDA has spoken, which documents
Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 107, 119
(2014).
9.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 [hereinafter APA].; Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
5 (Apr. 2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-205.pdf.
10. See Gottlieb, supra note 8 (“The agencys role in curating standards for medical technologies
can help advance innovation in areas that may lack consensus standards now.”).
11. See Erica Seiguer and John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug Administration:
Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 17, 22 (2005).
12. Stuart Shapiro, The Role of Guidance Documents in Agency Regulation, YALE J. REG. ONLINE
(May 9, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-role-of-guidance-documents-in-agency-regulation-by-stuartshapiro/.
13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16. Patrick McLaughlin, Regulatory Accumulation: The Problem and Solutions, MERCATUS
CTR.(Sept.27,2017),https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mclaughlin_-_policy_spotlight__regulatory_accumulation_-_v1.pdf.
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apply to its product, and the obligations created by these documents.17 As such,
reliance on mechanisms that are less formal than guidance may harm public health
and stifle innovation in much the same way as over-reliance on formal rulemaking.
This Note focuses on how courts can curb the abuse of guidance documents
and avoid the pitfalls associated with these two alternatives. One option for courts is
to treat notice-and-comment rulemaking as a necessary element of finality. Courts
that follow this approach refuse to resolve challenges to guidance documents on the
merits because they were not subjected to notice-and-comment procedures. This
would leave the permissibility of the decisions and actions outlined by the guidance
document unresolved. Alternatively, courts can classify such documents as final. This
would allow the court to review the merits of the guidance document and rule on
whether the policies it implements are permissible. This merits review would create
more uniformity and predictability via a court ruling explaining why the soft law
guidance document was a permissible agency action or not.
Part I of this Note identifies the ends of FDA regulation, the various
mechanisms the FDA uses to achieve these ends, and the Agency’s and regulated
entities’ attitudes toward guidance documents. Also, this section surveys the benefits
and risks associated with developing technology and the regulatory dilemma it
presents to the FDA: regulate early with little information and risk hampering the
development of crucial technology or abstain until more information is available and
risk losing the ability to effectively regulate. Part I.B uses nanotechnology as a case
study to further develop the consequences accompanying each side of the regulatory
dilemma. Part II highlights the importance of judicial review and identifies the two
options open to courts determining whether guidance documents that have foregone
notice-and-comment requirements are final. Courts may either treat the imposition
of notice-and-comment rulemaking as a necessary element of finality and refuse to
resolve challenges to guidance documents on the merits, or classify such documents
as final and conduct a merits review. Part III advocates for the latter solution because
it helps courts preserve agency discretion where appropriate, while principally
limiting discretion through a review process that incentivizes uniformity and
predictability. This solution is limited to documents that are practically binding on
the agency and does not apply to those that purport to bind the regulated. This
approach allows the Agency to meet the demands of regulating rapidly developing
technology with iterative, flexible, and incremental guidance; and helps courts block
agency actions that go beyond Congress’ grant of authority.
This essay carves out some middle ground in the larger debate regarding
how broadly to read Congress’ delegation of power to the FDA in the Food Drug
and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”). It recognizes reasons why courts should read the
FDCA broadly as a constitution permitting the FDA to “develop whatever
innovative and creative regulatory programs are reasonable and most appropriate to
17. See infra notes 140–142 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of clear regulatory
expectations for the industry).
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achieve the fundamental objectives laid down by Congress.”18 Similarly, it
appreciates the main concern motivating a narrower reading of the act: that leaving
the FDA's use of guidance under-supervised may permit the Agency to ignore
“statutory or constitutional line[s] when necessary to accomplish some valuable
end.”19 This essay suggests a form of judicial review that balances the need for
accountability and flexibility.20

I. FDA REGULATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF RAPIDLY
DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGY
The FDA is charged with “protecting the public health by ensuring the
safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and
medical devices.”21 It aims to promote public health “by helping to speed innovations
that make medical products more effective, safer, and more affordable.”22 The FDA’s
responsibility to speed innovation can come into tension with its obligation to protect
the public from unsafe or ineffective products, such as when terminal patients seek
access to unapproved drugs.23 Additionally, the FDA’s efforts to accomplish its
substantive mandate must meet procedural requirements.24 These procedures
increase transparency, and are designed to ensure the agency applies its policies
uniformly and predictably.25 However, these procedures also contemplate the need
for responsive and flexible administration.26 Like the FDA’s substantive goals, the
18. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 101, 102 (1995).
19. Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and
Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 903 (2008).
20. See infra Part III (discussing the value of judicial review in securing both flexibility to the FDA
to adapt to changing industry conditions and accountability in adhering to its statutory mandate).
21. What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do (last
visited Feb. 27, 2021).
22.

Id.

23. In such cases, the FDA must decide whether to strictly adhere to the typical approval timeline.
If they do not make an exception, they risk withholding potentially safe and effective drugs from people
who have run out of medical treatment options. However, making an exception exposes vulnerable
patients to unknown risks. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (seeking the use of an unapproved drug for patients
suffering from terminal illnesses); see also Suthers v. Amgen, 372 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(arguing for continued access to a drug after participating in an experimental trial).
24.

APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.

25. See Peter L. Strauss, Domesticating Guidance, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP
ARCHIVE,at1(June7,2019),https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3312&co
ntext=faculty_scholarship (also available at 49 LEWIS & CLARK ENV’T L. REV.765 (2019)).
26.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MISSION POSSIBLE: HOW FDA CAN MOVE AT THE SPEED
6 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/media/93524/download.
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procedural ends of responsiveness and uniformity come into conflict. Resolving the
competition between these procedural demands is particularly difficult when there is
both a pressing need for immediate action and a dearth of information—as is often
the case with emerging technology. This section suggests that, in such conditions,
the FDA can only fulfill its substantive and procedural obligations by implementing
an iterative, incremental, and flexible regulatory approach.27

A. FDA Regulatory Mechanisms
Congress delegates authority to the FDA through the FDCA. In these
provisions, Congress drafts general standards like “safe and effective” and leaves it
to the FDA to resolve smaller, technical issues and outline the content of these
standards in greater detail. The FDA carries out its mandate through two broad
mechanisms for rulemaking: formal regulations and informal guidance documents.
Formal regulations must be adopted through the notice-and-comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The agency brings
enforcement actions under formal, not informal, regulations.28 This enforcement
power is justified by more stringent procedural requirements that facilitate
accountability and public participation.29 First, the government must give notice of
proposed rules and state the legal basis and purpose for its actions. After an
opportunity for public comments, the government must respond.30 Final rules might
go through multiple public comment periods.31 After these notice-and-comment
periods, the final rule is published in the Federal Register and Codified in the Code
of Federal Regulations.32
These procedural requirements prevent hard law from keeping pace with
rapid technological innovation. For instance, a recent study by the Government
Accountability Office showed the APA notice-and-comment requirements take on
average four years to turn a proposed rule into its final form.33 The FDA’s

Cf. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRUG PRODUCTS, INCLUDING BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS,
CONTAIN
NANOMATERIALS:
GUIDANCE
FOR
INDUSTRY
1–2
(2017),
https://www.fda.gov/media/109910/download (discussing difficulties in regulation of evolving
nanotechnology within the limits of agency procedures).
27.

THAT

28.

Seiguer & Smith, supra note 11, at 18.

29.

See LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 117 (4th ed. 2017).

30.

APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).

31. OFF.
FED.
REG.,
A
GUIDE
TO
THE
RULEMAKING
PROCESS
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
32.

5,

Seiguer & Smith, supra note 11, at 18.

33. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS
TOTHETRANSPARENCYOFOMBREGULATORYREVIEWS5-6(2009),https://www.gao.gov/new.items
/d09205.pdf ("Based on the limited information available at the time of our review, the average time
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rulemaking process for dietary supplements and physician labeling requirements took
more than twice as long, clocking in at ten and fourteen years, respectively.34 These
procedures cost both time and money. If the FDA is limited to formal mechanisms,
the proliferation of idiosyncratic technologies that require individualized
consideration will increase the overall number of rules. The cost of trying to keep
pace would be staggering.
Given these costs and the speed at which technology develops, the FDA
has increasingly relied on guidance documents.35 Guidance takes many forms.
Occasionally the FDA will send letters to industry entities.36 Other times the
guidance document takes the form of a policy statement or interpretation published
in the federal register.37 The FDA uses the documents to set agency policy about
enforcement priorities and standards of conduct for its staff38 as well as to inform the
regulated about which approaches meet the FDA’s standards. The Agency also
communicates its interpretation of ambiguous statutes or regulations through
guidance.39 When regulated entities adhere to guidance documents, it would be
unfair for the Agency to accuse them of non-compliance after they relied on the
position the Agency outlined in the guidance document.40
Throughout its history the FDA has refined its guidance practices.41 To try
to maintain industry confidence in the certainty of guidance documents, the FDA
drafted regulations outlining “Good Guidance Practices.”42 Passed as part of the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act in 1992, the FDA’s Good
Guidance Practices announced that the agency would not consider guidance
documents to be binding on the agency.43 Additionally, the FDA renewed its promise
to apply statutes and regulations consistently and took steps to ensure greater

needed to complete a rulemaking across our 16 case-study rules was about 4 years, with a range from about
1 year to nearly 14 years, but there was considerable variation among agencies and rules.”).
34.

Id. at 18.

35.

Gottlieb, supra note 8.

36. Letters to Industry, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/industry-medical-devices/letters-industry (last visited Dec. 4, 2019); Henley v. Food & Drug
Admin., 873 F. Supp. 777, 782–83 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing a volley of letters sent by the FDA that
both adjudicates a citizen’s petition challenging labeling requirements and communicates guidance
regarding labeling requirements).
37.

21 C.F.R. § 10.115(g) (2011).

38.

Strauss, supra note 25, at 2–3.

39.

Id. at 2.

40.

See id. at 3.

41.

See 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40683 (Sept. 3, 1975).

42. See Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2011) (these GGPs were then codified in
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, 21 USC §§ 101–405(1997)).
43.

57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47314 (Oct. 15, 1992).
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participation and transparency.44 Though one intended results of the Good Guidance
Practices was to render all forms of informal guidance non-binding upon the agency,
courts frequently find the FDA is bound to follow guidance documents.45
The APA identifies “general statements of policy” and “interpretative
rules” as two types of guidance, but the Act subjects them both to the same
procedures.46 Unlike formal regulations, guidance does not undergo robust noticeand-comment rulemaking under the APA.47 Instead, guidance documents go through
one of two processes depending on whether they are classified as level 1 or level 2.48
Level 1 guidance documents provide interpretations of statutes or regulations, set
forth policy changes that are more than minor, include complex scientific
information, or otherwise “cover highly controversial issues.”49 Procedural demands
on level 1 guidance are less robust than notice and comment, but more substantial
than those imposed on level 2 documents.50 Level 2 guidance documents cover “less
consequential matters.”51 Importantly, neither process requires the agency respond
to the comments it receives.52 As it is fairly difficult to determine in practice when a
guidance document is sufficiently serious to warrant classification as Level 1,53 the
agency can avoid more robust procedural requirements by characterizing guidance as
level 2 or by leaving documents in draft form.54 Whereas level 1 requires the agency
to publish notice of the guidance document in both the Federal Register and online
and to implement the document immediately, notice of level 2 guidance documents
need only be posted online (not in the Federal Register), and the FDA can delay the
implementation of level 2 guidance documents. 55
The attitudes of the FDA and industry toward guidance converge and
diverge in interesting ways. For one, regulated parties often feel a large amount of
pressure to follow guidance documents.56 Sometimes this drives them to seek
44.

62 Fed. Reg. 8963, 8963 (Feb. 27, 1997).

45.

57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47315 (Oct. 15, 1992); Lewis, supra note 3, at 523–24.

46. Strauss, supra note 25, at 4; Ronald Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN.
L. REV. 263, 320 (2018).
47.

APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).

48.

21 C.F.R. §§ 10.115(c)(1)–(2) (2011).

49.

21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1) (2011).

50.

21 C.F.R. § 10.115(g) (2011).

51.

Noah, supra note 8, at 100.

52.

Lewis, supra note 3, at 522.

53.

Id.

54. See Noah, supra note 8, at 101-02; See e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26,
28–30 (D.D.C. 1995) (providing an example of the FDA seeking to avoid judicial review of a policy
statement by keeping it as a draft rather than final agency action).
55.

21 C.F.R. §§ 10.115(g)(1)–(4) (2011).

56.

Parrillo, supra note 6, at 174.
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individual variances or exemptions, but it is hard to predict whether an agency will
grant such a request. The agency’s decisions is largely influenced by a particular
official’s fears about the potential wide spread effects of her decision.57 FDA officials
often feel strong pressures from various stakeholders to behave consistently and
predictably, so the agency is reticent to grant variances and exceptions.58 Moreover,
since the multitude of a party’s regulatory obligations make non-compliance fairly
likely, regulated entities often seek to develop a strong relationship with the FDA.59
Industry players hope to earn points for compliance with regulations and guidance
wherever possible to help convince the FDA to be lenient when they fail to comply.
The FDA’s role in dispensing valuable incentives (e.g. market approval and
exclusivity), increases the pressure to appease the agency through compliance.60 To
avoid wasting their substantial investment in the pre-market approval process,
industry entities follow even draft guidance closely because approval decisions are
largely discretionary.61
From the FDA’s perspective, the ability to ensure compliance without
having to spend resources on notice-and-comment procedures is one reason guidance
documents are particularly valuable.62 Another reason is that agencies can argue,
often successfully, that guidance documents are typically not ripe for judicial review
because the guidance does not constitute final agency action.63 So, the agency has a
lot of control over whether and when its actions are subject to challenge in court.64
Guidance fills gaps left by formal rules and helps reduce uncertainty, thereby
preventing the applicant from “investing in protocols that will not meet with
approval.”65 Guidance also conserves enforcement resources, as regulated parties
have the perception that repeated violation of guidance documents carries the threat
of closer surveillance by the agency.66 The FDA has to use discretion in when and
how to enforce its regulations to best use its scarce resources.
In light of its responsibility and the difficult regulatory challenges it faces,
the FDA often toes the line between creative problem-solving and abuse of
discretion. That said, the harms caused by agency overreach, both to the regulated
entity and the broader public, are severe. Additionally, the FDA leverages its power
57.

Id. at 240.

58.

Id. at 174.

59.

Id. at 177.

60.

Id. at 184–85.

61.

See id. at 186 (noting how the FDA can threaten to delay approval to promote compliance).

62.

See id. at 199.

63.

Noah, supra note 7, at 887.

64.

Id. at 874.

65.

Parrillo, supra note 6, at 187.

66. Id. at 199 (suggesting that this fear is overblown as reviewers in charge of pre-approval rarely
learn of enforcement-related disputes).
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over regulated industries to stifle challenges to its actions that would reveal instances
of overreach. These features of our system make it important to ensure judicial
review is accessible, particularly in the case of innovators producing rapidly
developing technology, as most of these innovators' obligations are defined in
guidance documents.

B. Rapidly Developing Technology and the Collingridge Dilemma
Rapidly developing technology presents tremendous benefits and
disastrous risks. This creates a Scylla and Charybdis which the FDA must navigate:
overregulation may delay or prevent the entry of useful technology,67 but underregulation may endanger public health by allowing the continued use of unsafe or
ineffective technologies.68 As uncertainty regarding benefits and risks associated with
nanotechnology is particularly acute, and formal mechanisms cannot keep pace with
the development of nanotechnology, it provides a good case study to explore how the
FDA can use guidance documents to regulate effectively without exceeding its
statutory authority.69
Nanotechnology is implemented in every field that the FDA regulates. The
agency defines nanotechnology as (1) a product engineered to have at least one
external dimension, or an internal or surface structure, in the nanoscale range
(approximately 1nm to 100nm)” or (2) if its dimensions fall outside that range, a
product engineered to exhibit properties or phenomena…that are attributable to its
dimensions.”70 Nanotechnology has exceptional promise for treating various diseases.
For instance, nanotechnology is used to target cells more accurately. The increased
accuracy in the delivery of cancer treating drugs increases their efficacy by avoiding
under and over-dosing—both of which frequently cause damage to healthy cells in

67. See Kenneth A. Young, Of Poops and Parasites: Unethical FDA Overregulation, 69 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 555, 555 (2014); Henry I. Miller, Editorial, Overregulation is an Unnecessary Hindrance to Human Gene
Therapy, 6 HUM. GENE THERAPY 1361, 1361 (1995) (Eliminating unnecessary layers of gene therapy
regulation would be a win-win proposition” that would allow money to be funneled toward research rather
than meeting regulatory requirements.).
68. See Lars Noah, Federal Regulatory Responses to the Prescription Opioid Crisis: Too Little, Too Late?,
2019 UTAH L. REV. 757, 757–58 (discussing the FDA’s contribution to the opioid crisis through underregulation); Robin Marantz Henig, The Dalkon Shield Disaster, WASH POST (Nov. 17, 1985),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1985/11/17/the-dalkon-shielddisaster/6c58f354-fa50-46e5-877a-10d96e1de610/. Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for
Drug Safety and Regulation, HELIX (July 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomidetragedy-lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation.
69.

Hagemann et al., supra note 2.

70. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY CONSIDERING WHETHER AN
FDA-REGULATED PRODUCT INVOLVES THE APPLICATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 3 (2014),
https://www.fda.gov/media/88423/download.
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the body.71 Nanotechnology also has diagnostic applications. Researchers have
developed a targeted gold nanoparticle that acts as a contrast agent in screening for
early-stage cancer.72 Earlier detection often improves the efficacy of subsequent
treatments and a patient’s chance of recovery.73
Despite these clear benefits, nanomaterials may be harmful.74 Toxic
nanotechnology used in drugs can injure organs where nanomaterial resides for
unknown amounts of time.75 The effects nanoparticles have on particular organs is
difficult to track because nanoparticles go through unique changes as they pass
through various biological barriers.76 Passing through these barriers may alter their
composition and their impact on the human body.77 The ability of nanotechnology
to cross the blood-brain barrier is particularly concerning.78 As a result, some
governments have adopted a cautious approach until more research uncovers the
features and bugs of this new technology.79
The regulatory difficulties associated with nanotechnology are one instance
of the Collingridge Dilemma. This dilemma forces agencies to choose between either
accepting the consequences that come with regulating a new technology early in its
development or bearing the costs associated with waiting until there is more
information about the technology.80 Earlier intervention is easier, but more likely to
mitigate the impact of the technology (both positive and negative); later intervention
struggles to mitigate the potential harms of technology, but better understands the
particular regulatory demands created by the innovation.81 In the context of rapidly
71. Frank Alexis et al, New Frontiers in Nanotechnology for Cancer Treatment, 26 UROLOGIC
ONCOLOGY: SEMINARS & ORIGINAL INVESTIGATIONS 74, 77 (2008).
72. A. Agarwal et al., Targeted Gold Nano Rod Contrast Agent for Prostate Cancer Detection by Photo
Acoustic Imaging, 102 J. APPLIED PHYSICS 064701, 064701–1 (2007).
73. Cancer, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://www.who.int/cancer/detection/en/ (last
visited Dec. 20, 2019).
74. MARGIE PATLAK & CHRISTINE MICHEEL, NANOTECHNOLOGY AND ONCOLOGY
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 42 (2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/13037/chapter/1.
75. Health Risks of Nanotechnology: How Nanoparticles Can Cause Lung Damage, And How The
DamageCanBeBlocked,SCIENCEDAILY(June11,2009),https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/
090610192431.htm.
76. Marziyeh Ajdary et al., Health Concerns of Various Nanoparticles: A Review of Their in Vitro and
in Vivo Toxicity, 8 NANOMATERIALS, August 21, 2018, at 1, 4.
77. Patlak & Micheel, supra note 74; Paul FA Wright, Perspectives: Potential Risks and Benefits of
Nanotechnology: Perception of Risks in Sunscreens, 204 MED. J. AUSTL. 369, 369–370 (2016).
78. Jordan Paradise, Regulating Nanomedicine at the Food and Drug Administration, 21 AM. MED.
ASS’N J. ETHICS 347 (2019).
79. Catharine Paddock, Nanotechnology in Medicine: Huge Potential, But What Are The Risks?, MED.
NEWS TODAY (May 4, 2012), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/244972.php#1.
80.

DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 11 (1980).

81.

Id.
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developing technology, the FDA must decide whether to implement informal
guidelines—that can take effect relatively immediately—or to initiate the notice-andcomment rulemaking procedure which often takes years to complete.82
Many scholars adopt a precautionary principle in response to the
Collingridge dilemma.83 They recommend early intervention that simultaneously
avoids limiting innovation to the greatest extent possible.84 As more information
about the risks, rewards, and trajectory of regulated technology becomes available,
the informal regulations can be formalized without fear of stifling innovation or
threatening public health.85 Only informal guidance documents can regulate rapidly
developing technology in a way that balances the benefits of innovation and the
importance of public health. If we embrace these technologies and the precautionary
principle,86 then we should also embrace informal guidance documents. This entails
committing to reforming, rather than replacing, guidance documents. Reforms
should reduce the burden guidance documents place on the regulated while
maintaining the documents’ efficacy. The next section examines whether guidance
documents can promote uniformity, achieve predictable enforcement, and principally
limit agency discretion.

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW: TO DISMISS FOR PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES OR
ADJUDICATE THE MERITS
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, soft law mechanisms and
guidance documents are often subjected to criticism. To a large extent, criticisms
leveled by scholars87 have been picked up by courts and politicians. Since 1984,
agencies have enjoyed significant deference from the judiciary when interpreting

82.

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 33, at 5.

83. WENDELL WALLACH, A DANGEROUS MASTER: HOW TO KEEP TECHNOLOGY FROM
SLIPPING BEYOND OUR CONTROL 73 (2015); Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 179–80 (2014); Timothy B. Lee, The way we regulate self-driving cars is broken—
here’s how to fix it, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2018) https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/04/the-way-weregulate-self-driving-cars-is-broken-heres-how-to-fix-it/ (technology is changing so fast that any regulations
written today are likely to be obsolete in a few years).
84.

See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 83, at 201–02.

85. Cf. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1411 (2011) (describing the
costs of information-rich decision environments).
86. Scholars like Jean Warshaw have suggested that agencies do embrace a precautionary principle.
Jean Warshaw, The Trend Towards Implementing the Precautionary Principle in US Regulation of Nanomaterials,
10 DOSE-RESPONSE 384, 384 (2012) (“Recent developments in the regulation of nanomaterials that are
not drugs or pesticides have demonstrated a trend towards application of the precautionary principle.”).
87. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review,
16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 103 (2018) (seeking “to help judges, legislators, litigants, and scholars
focus their calls for reforming how courts review agency interpretations of law” by surveying key
arguments in favor of and against deference to agencies).
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statutes that are ambiguous under the Chevron doctrine;88 however, Chevron
deference has begun to receive challenges, notably from Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Kavanaugh.89 Many of these challenges build on earlier judicial efforts to narrow
Chevron’s scope and limit or eliminate Skidmore and Auer deference.90 Determining
the legal effect of guidance documents will help identify which complaints about the
use of guidance are well-founded and thereby shape potential solutions.
Agencies’ use of guidance documents to circumvent accountability
requirements and issue regulations without public input is one primary cause for
concern.91 This use of guidance documents escapes the general administrative
practice of imposing more process on agencies when they seek greater coercive
power.92 Moreover, the capture of the FDA by partisan and industry interests could
undermine public participation in the development of soft law:93 captured officials
circumvent procedural mechanisms by failing to give public comments due
consideration. This part focuses on the lack of judicial accountability and how courts
might increase accountability by reviewing the merits of informal agency actions.

A. The Three Paths Available to Courts Confronted with Guidance Documents
Courts reviewing challenges to guidance documents typically take
themselves to have two options: dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because
the document is not final, or vacate the guidance on the merits because it “is a final
regulation but was promulgated in violation of the APA.”94 However, courts have a
88.

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).

89. See generally Heather Elliott, Gorsuch v. the Administrative State, 70 ALA. L. REV. 703 (2019);
Kristin E. Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron Deference, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 733 (2019); Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo v. SEC, and the PostKennedy Supreme Court, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 193 (2019).
90. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 66–69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Gorsuch recently wrote a concurrence advocating for the elimination of Auer deference. Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). He was joined by Thomas,
Kavanaugh, and Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts suggested that “the distance between the majority and
Justice Gorsuch is not as great as it may initially appear.” Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).
91. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 408 (2007) (explaining the ways in which guidance documents are subject to lesser public input
and congressional and executive oversight).
92.

APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553.

93. A captured official uses his or her position to advance the interests of the powerful, rather
than to create policy that is responsive or good.” Alexander A. Guerrero, Against Elections: The Lottocratic
Alternative, 42 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 135, 142 (2014). See generally Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d
162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (criticizing the FDA and the Secretary of Health and Human Services for refusing
to approve Plan-B for over the counter use during an election year for fear of political repercussions).
94. Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 226 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The court may stay the
effect of the rule before it is used in an enforcement action by the agency or “permit the agency to supplement
the record for its review, remand the rule to the agency, and vacate the rule.” LELAND E. BECK, AGENCY
PRACTICES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING 76 (2013),
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third option. They can find the document was final and conduct a full review of the
merits even when documents failed to comply with notice-and-comment
requirements.95 On this approach the court looks beyond procedural shortcomings to
determine whether the agency document’s interpretation or policy is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”96
Federal courts have jurisdiction over final regulations.97 Courts deploy the
test formulated in Bennet v. Spear to determine whether an agency action is final:
“First, the action mustmark the ‘consummation’ of the agency's decisionmaking
process….[a]nd second, the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have
been determined,” or from which legal consequences will flow.’”98 With regard to
the first prong, an agency action that is not “tentative or interlocutory in nature”
marks the consummation of its decision making process.99 The inclusion of “final” in
the document’s title constitutes strong evidence of finality.100 A document can even
be final if it contains a disclaimer indicating that “[t]he policies set forth in this paper
are intended solely as guidance, do not represent final Agency action, and cannot be
relied upon to create any rights enforceable by any party.”101 In Appalachian Power
Company v. Environmental Protection Agency, the DC Circuit reasoned that this was
boilerplate and the surrounding language strongly suggested that the document was
binding.
Unfortunately, courts often avoid determining the legitimacy of informal
guidance documents on the merits. A few factors stymie judicial review. For one, the
FDA seeks to prevent courts from weighing in on the effect of documents (i.e.
whether they are final) by construing compliance as “voluntary.”102 Lars Noah calls
the practice of using leverage to impose illegitimate requirements through documents
that purport to be voluntary “arm-twisting.”103 Distinguishing between permissible

https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Agency%20Practices%20and%20Judicial%20Review%20of%20Ad
ministrative%20Records%20in%20Informal%20Rulemaking.pdf.
95. Strauss, supra note 25, at 9; William Funk, Final Agency Action After Hawks, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Liberty 285, 304 (2017).
96.

APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

97. 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (working in accordance with provisions 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 determining
forum, venue, and when the petitioner must first seek relief from the agency).
98.

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).

99.

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1023 (emphasis added) (quoting EPA, PERIODIC MONITORING GUIDANCE FOR TITLE
V OPERATING PERMITS PROGRAMS 19 (1998)).
102. Noah, supra note 8, at 123 (identifying various ways in which the FDA utilizes arm-twisting
strategies to extend its power).
103. Id.
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guidance practices and arm-twisting is largely up to courts.104 Accordingly, the FDA
has attempted to shield its arm-twisting efforts from judicial review by keeping
guidance documents in the draft stage rather than finalizing them.105 Washington Legal
Foundation v. Kessler presents one example of such an effort: a public-interest group
advocating on behalf of doctors targeted an FDA policy prohibiting manufacturers
of medical products from distributing information relating to off-label use.106 The
FDA responded that its policy was not final and as such the issue was unripe.107 In
this case the FDA’s efforts failed: the court rejected the FDA’s argument, finding
that the policy was appropriate for review because it had the practical effect of
binding the regulated party.108
Guidance documents are also rarely litigated, and when they are “their
treatment is contentious and confused.”109 Determining finality is difficult. Courts
struggle to determine whether compliance with a document is accurately
characterized as voluntary.110 In Bennet the court provides a sufficient test for finality,
but a guidance document may be final even if it does not actually determine legal
rights or obligations, so long as it is practically binding.111 Agency documents are
binding in practice when they appear to bind either the agency, the regulated parties,
or both.112 When it comes to determining whether compliance is mandatory, industry
actors are often as confused as courts. This is demonstrated by a multitude of
instances where parties ask for permission to deviate from guidance documents which
are not supposed to be binding on anyone but the agency.113 Despite these difficulties,
there are good reasons for courts to characterize guidance documents that bind the
government, but not the regulated, as final and to subsequently review the merits of

104. See Hale Melnick, Guidance Documents and Rules: Increasing Executive Accountability in the
Regulatory World, 44B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 357, 367 (2017) (discussing the obstacles to effective judicial
review of guidance documents).
105. Id.
106. Wash. Legal Found v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D.D.C. 1995).
107. Id. at 33.
108. Id. at 36.
109. Strauss, supra note 25, at 3.
110. Hagemann et al., supra note 2, at 115.
111. See Funk, supra note 95, at 288–89 (analyzing the court’s decision in U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (2016)).
112. Strauss, supra note 25, at 6.
113. See Lars Noah, BDSM in Administrative Procedure: Using Agency Guidance for Bondage
andDiscipline3(Jan.27,2020)(unpublishedmanuscript),https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3391569; see also Parrillo, supra note 6, at 232–237 (discussing reasons firms might seek approval to
depart from requirements outlined in guidance, and why other regulated entities often oppose these
requests).
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these documents—even when they did not undergo the notice-and-comment
procedure.114

B. After Finality
After a reviewing court determines a guidance document is final, it can do
one of two things: vacate it for failure to comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment
procedures, or determine whether the agency action is arbitrary and capricious. The
D.C. Circuit followed the first approach in its treatment of an FDA guidance
document in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young.115 The Community Nutrition
Institute challenged the FDA’s guidance establishing “action levels” that set the
allowable levels of unavoidable contaminants in foods, like corn.116 The court vacated
the agency’s guidance because it determined the rights and obligations of the plaintiff
without subjecting the document to notice-and-comment requirements.117
The D.C. Circuit followed the second approach in Appalachian Power
Company v. Environmental Protection Agency.118 In Appalachian Power, the EPA
published guidance documents imposing periodic monitoring requirements on power
companies and the chemical and petroleum industry.119 In determining whether the
guidance document was final, the court looked to the agency’s attitude toward the
document.120 It sought to determine whether the agency acted as if the document was
controlling, treated the document as if it were a legislative rule, or based enforcement
on policies or interpretations included in the document. If the agency did, then the
guidance document was binding “for all practical purposes.”121
Subsequent jurists have taken the court’s reasoning to indicate that
compliance with notice-and-comment procedures is a necessary element of finality.122
Despite this popular use of Appalachian Power, the D.C. Circuit actually went on to
find the guidance at issue was reviewable on the merits and determined that the
guidance document was an unreasonable reading of the regulation it was meant to
interpret.123 Accordingly, the reasoning courts and commentators often rely on is

114. Strauss, supra note 25, at 14–15.
115. 818 F.2d 943, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 946–47, 950.
118. 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
119. Id. at 1015–18.
120. Id. at 1021.
121. Id. at 1022.
122. Strauss, supra note 25, at 14.
123. 208 F.3d at 1023.
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merely dictum. In some cases, notice-and-comment is sufficient, but not necessary
for finality.124
Courts rarely exercise their power to review practically binding documents
on the merits.125 This power is an important tool, as many of the benefits achieved
through notice-and-comment procedures can be adequately promoted by allowing
judicial review.126 This tool may be the best alternative available for regulating
rapidly developing technology, as allowing unchecked agency discretion or
completely replacing informal regulation with formal rules exposes the public to
substantial risk and chills innovation.127 By reviewing the substantive merits of
guidance documents, courts can prevent the FDA from abusing guidance documents
while affording the agency the flexibility it needs to fulfill its statutory mandate. I
now turn to the merits of this approach.

III.SECURING THE LEGITIMACY OF GUIDANCE
When judges assess whether guidance documents hue sufficiently closely to
the relevant regulation or statute, they enable guidance documents to promote
uniformity and predictability. This effectively limits the FDA’s discretion and
preserves the flexibility the FDA needs to deal with unique regulatory demands
created by the new technologies. Whenever the Agency wishes to change its policy,
it could likely withdraw the guidance document and implement new regulatory
requirements through notice-and-comment procedures—provided that the court
reviewing the initial guidance document found it was one of multiple permissible
interpretations of the FDCA rather than the only permissible interpretation.128 After
showing the practical effects test obtains these advantages when it is applied to
guidance documents that purport to bind the agency, I give some reasons to prefer
judicial reform to legislative action. Crucially, this approach is permitted by the
language of the APA, which exempts actions from notice-and-comment requirements
when “the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon

124. Funk, supra note 95, at 285.
125. See generally David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Shortcut, 120 YALE L.J. 276 (2010) (explaining why judges wisely resist taking the shortcut of asking
whether an agency used notice-and-comment procedures to determine whether an action was final).
126. See Strauss, supra note 25, at 15.
127. See supra notes 67–68, 80–85 and accompanying text (discussing the Collingridge dilemma and
the harms of under- and over-regulation).
128. Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’nv.Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984–85 (2005)
(holding that an agency could adopt a regulation that deviates from a previous regulation upheld by a
court only if it the previous court found the statutory language was unambiguous); see also Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (refusing to overturn Auer, which defines the deference courts must afford
to agency interpretations of regulations).
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are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”129 I close by
addressing two counterarguments: (1) permitting broader and more searching judicial
review risks encouraging litigation which is costly to the FDA; and (2) if judicial
deference to agencies is eroded or eliminated, the approach I outline will inhibit the
permissible use of guidance documents by making these documents more likely to be
vacated on the merits.
Encouraging judicial review of the merits of agency actions that are
practically binding—even when they have not gone through notice-and-comment
procedures—helps secure the benefits of both Agency discretion and the rule of law.
This solution provides the agency the discretion it needs to flexibly respond to the
specific concerns raised by the many rapidly developing technologies in each of the
regulatory classes under the FDA’s control.130 With regard to predictability and
uniformity, a more permissive conception of reviewability conforms with the APA’s
recognition that guidance plays a key role in ensuring predictability and public
knowledge of its policies.131 As illustrated above, agency guidance need not go
through notice-and-comment rulemaking to make agency action more predictable.132
The litigation costs this imposes on the agency are worth tolerating, since the
alternative is to leave agencies unstructured discretion in regulating rapidly
developing technology.133
The possibility of judicial review provides sufficient oversight to prevent
the agency from abusing its discretion. For instance, it discourages the FDA from
arguing that the guidance document cannot be reviewed because it is not a final
agency action, like it did in Washington Legal Foundation v. Kessler,134 because the
possibility of having the document struck down on the merits provides a stronger
disincentive than just setting aside the guidance document or dismissing the
challenge. Invalidation on the merits can foreclose a substantive regulatory route,
while vacating a guidance document leaves similar strategies more open in the
future—as does requesting that the agency further develop the administrative
record.135 The worst-case scenario under judicial review escalates from having to
invest in notice-and-comment rulemaking to having a substantive regulatory path
foreclosed.
While judicial review will allow some documents to be struck down on the
merits, it will also allow some to be upheld. This is a sweetener for the FDA because
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).
130. See Hagemann et al., supra note 2, at 67.
131. See id. at 64–65; see also 5 U.S.C. §§551–559.
132. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text (discussing industry entities’ desire for draft
guidance as it clarifies their obligations).
133. Strauss, supra note 25, at 15.
134. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D.D.C. 1995).
135. Strauss, supra note 25, at 16.
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it provides validation of their substantive policies without the agency having to invest
extensive time and money into notice-and-comment requirements or relying on
Congress to legislatively adopt the guidance document.136 Accordingly, it will cost
the agency less to bind its own agents, facilitating uniform regulatory practices. This
provides a substantial incentive for the FDA to make clear which guidance
documents it takes more seriously. More merits review disincentives arm-twisting
and provides a source of authorization without requiring notice-and-comment
rulemaking or explicit congressional action.
Judicial review also permits the agency to more flexibly tailor its regulatory
approach to the specific features of the technology. Importantly, the agency retains
some control over when a guidance document becomes reviewable.137 For instance,
the agency can avoid indicating that it takes the guidance document particularly
seriously to try to shelter it from judicial review as it irons out the details of its policy.
The best way the agency can protect guidance is by clearly indicating to industry that
the guidance is not meant to be practically binding.138 If the agency convinces the
court its document was not meant to be binding on the agency itself, it will be able
to resolve the case before the court reaches the merits—where litigation costs really
start to pile up. Then, once the Agency feels confident the document is effective and
adheres to the relevant regulation or statute, it can transition from development into
implementation. This iterative process can be repeated as more information about
the technology becomes available. The agency can build on more solid a foundation
when past iterations have been upheld in court. Since litigation is expensive and the
FDA already has very limited resources, allowing the FDA to retain some control
over when to litigate is crucial.139
Moreover, merits review provides substantial benefits to the regulated. For
one, it prevents the morass of active FDA documents from chilling innovation.140
This problem is particularly acute for innovators producing rapidly developing
technology and other fields that the FDA regulates almost exclusively through
guidance.141 An unequivocal indication of which guidance the FDA takes particularly
seriously makes it easier for industry to identify and adhere to its obligations.
Additionally, this approach provides incentives for plaintiffs challenging FDA
136. Noah, supra note 7, at 923 (concluding that the FDA could effectively regulate industry
without ever designating a policy "final").
137. See Strauss, supra note 25, at 6.
138. See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 150 and accompanying (discussing the FDA’s efforts to make good use of its
scarce resources).
140. See McLaughlin, supra note 16.
141. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS AND
MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/policy-device-software-functions-and-mobile-medical-applications.
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guidance. Plaintiffs that challenge the FDA’s guidance might convince the court to
foreclose the substantive policies as an unreasonable interpretation or construction
of the statute. This is a more lasting victory than vacating the document for
inadequate procedure. Accordingly, industry players will be more likely to file a suit
when the FDA failed to adequately protect their interest—though this litigation may
be made more difficult by the absence of the factual record ordinarily developed by
notice-and-comment rulemaking.142 These suits also help cut through the existing
regulatory morass and clarify the FDA’s expectations. The public stands to benefit
from the novel medical technology made possible by a system that fosters scientific
progress by giving innovators a clear sense of which regulatory requirements apply.
Allocating some responsibility to the judiciary to curb the FDA’s discretion
comes with important advantages. For one, Congress may have too much on its plate
to legislate minor details in a fine-grained way. The fact that Congress will invite,
invalidate, or adopt guidance documents suggests Congress recognizes its own
inability to keep up with the pacing problem of rapidly developing technology.143
Indeed, a pattern has emerged where the FDA will try to regulate in a way that
exceeds its statutory authority, then Congress will endorse the FDA’s action by
explicitly extending its statutory authority.144 Thus, while it is helpful when
Congress clarifies their views regarding the reasonableness of various guidance
documents, it cannot be counted on to serve this function for each guidance
document that an agency decides to make binding on itself.
Moreover, the question of a guidance document’s permissibility will often
be a fact-specific inquiry that hinges on technical aspects of the technology. This is
in part driven by the difficulty of developing a regulatory scheme from scratch
because the FDA opts to regulate by analogy. This has been the FDA’s approach
with nanotechnology. The agency has extended its existing authority over pre-market
review and post-market monitoring, for instance over new drugs and biologics, to
cover nanotechnology and advised consulting the FDA where it lacks authority.145
The FDAs current approach to nanotechnology deploys premarket review authority
where it exists and encourages nanotechnology developers to frequently consult the
FDA throughout stages of development.146 The agency notes that nanotechnology
can be used in a broad array of FDA-regulated products,” but the regulatory scheme
142. Strauss, supra note 25, at 17.
143. Indeed, if administrative officials with more expertise addressing a narrower range of problems
struggle to keep pace, it should come as no surprise that it would be even more difficult for Congress to
consistently check agency discretion. See Hagemann et al., supra note 2, at 83.
144. Noah, supra note 8, 135 n.203.
145. FDA’s Approach to Regulation of Nanotechnology Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/science-research/nanotechnology-programs-fda/fdas-approach-regulationnanotechnology-products (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
146. Id.
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utilized for dietary supplements differs significantly from that used for medical
devices which in turn varies from the FDAs approach to regulating drugs.147 As the
FDAs characterization of the technology greatly impacts which regulatory regime
will be enforced, this merits inquiry would be a fact specific one examining the way
the technology functions and how it interacts with various systems in the human
body.
This inquiry would be easier to conduct inside a courtroom than outside of
one. We frequently trust judges with this kind of task. For instance, patent litigation
regarding whether an alleged innovation is sufficiently different from prior literature
depends on a deep understanding of the science supporting the technology.148 Judges
often have to know enough about the inner workings of various drugs to determine
when it is appropriate to defer to the FDA’s conclusion regarding what constitutes
compliance with a statute. For instance, courts readily assess whether the new drug
is similar enough to apply the Abbreviated New Drug Application mechanisms, for
drugs that perform similarly to already approved drugs, rather than requiring
approval under the New Drug Application provisions, which are subjected to
heightened safety and efficacy standards.149 Indeed, cases against the FDA are
frequently brought in D.C. District court where judges have expertise relevant to the
intricate, technically complex questions the FDA must resolve.
Despite these benefits, some may worry that this approach does too much
to encourage litigation, which is costly to the FDA. This concern is heightened by
the fact that money spent litigating is money not spent on other important regulatory
functions, as the FDA has meager resources.150 This criticism lands if the amount the
FDA spends on litigation exceeds that spent on complying with notice-and-comment
in the long run. I have two responses. First, this criticism may overestimate two
likelihoods: (1) the likelihood of challenges to guidance documents that purport to
bind the FDA; and (2) the likelihood of the FDA losing these challenges. Regarding
these likelihoods, the approach I have described preserves judicial deference. This
deference provides the FDA a noteworthy advantage at the merits stage. This makes
it less likely for the FDA to lose than this objection might assume, and as a result
reduces the likelihood of a challenge. Second, money spent litigating claims might
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1346–50 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
149. See, e.g., Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b),(j).
150. See Parrillo, supra note 6, at 197 (discussing discretion not only about whether to pursue
enforcement but also what form of proceedings to adopt). While Congress could also increase the FDA’s
budget (and has done so fairly consistently) the fact that these increases are insufficient is supported by
the accompanying increase in user fees the FDA has charged to try to bridge the gap. See AGATA
DABROWSKA & VICTORIA R. GREEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44576, THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION(FDA)BUDGET:FACTSHEET1-3(2020),https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R
/R44576#:~:text=Between%20FY2016%20and%20FY2020%2C%20FDA's,fee%20revenue%20increased%20by%
2033%25.
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result in a court order upholding the guidance document. Notice-and-comment is
one way of validating a policy approach, merits review allows litigation to serve as
another. Litigation can be seen as an investment in viability of the measures in the
guidance document and may cost less than notice-and-comment rulemaking more
often than not.
Another concern is that the viability of the approach I have outlined
depends on courts continuing to defer to agencies. This concern is validated by the
recent reform efforts to eliminate or reduce guidance. One effort by law makers, The
Separation of Powers Restoration Act, was introduced in the Senate in March of
2019.151 The Act proposes amending the APA to eliminate Chevron deference.152 A
similar provision could be developed to eliminate Auer and Skidmore deference.
While some are skeptical about the likelihood these efforts will prevail,153 they should
be taken seriously. Reducing or eliminating judicial deference undermines the
incentive structure of the merits review outlined above. A weaker, more pliable
deference doctrine undercuts advantages of merits review by making the outcome of
these cases harder to predict. This may encourage the FDA to move to even less
formal, less accountable mechanisms like informal adjudication through enforcement
actions.154 It also risks increasing the cost of litigation by making it harder for the
Agency to determine which suits it should settle. This makes it more difficult for the
agency to allocate its scarce resources wisely by making it less obvious which cases
are clear winners that warrant full litigation and which to abandon before the court
makes a merits determination. Eliminating or reducing deference would likely mean
that more guidance documents would be struck down as arbitrary and capricious.
However, there is some reason to doubt eliminating deference would lead
to an increase in litigation at least in regulatory areas where the FDA has pre-market
approval authority. The cost of obtaining pre-market approval creates some incentive
for companies to litigate guidance documents in hopes of achieving easier approval
standards that cost less to comply with. That said, even after the elimination of
deference, regulated entities would still be concerned the FDA would be less inclined
to grant premarket approval after defending against these firms’ efforts to lower
premarket approval costs in court. Under my approach, the FDA would retain
substantial discretion regarding which applications to approve and when. This
ameliorates some concerns about the frequency with which regulated entities would
file drug suits. In response to the second criticism, then, it is worth recognizing that

151. Separation of Powers Restoration Act, S. 909, 116th Cong. (2019).
152 [T]he court shall not interpret that gap or ambiguity as an implicit delegation to the agency
of legislative rulemaking authority and shall not rely on the gap or ambiguity as a justification for
interpreting agency authority expansively or for deferring to the agencys interpretation on the question
of law.” Id. § 2(2)(B).
153. Hagemann et al., supra note 2, at 120.
154. Supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
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the approach I propose will likely be adversely impacted if reform proposals seeking
to weaken or eliminate deference are successful.

IV.CONCLUSION
Rapidly developing technologies have forced the FDA—a small, overextended agency—to develop increasingly creative regulatory strategies. The FDA
relies primarily on informal guidance documents to fulfill its statutory mandate and
use its scarce resources economically. These informal guidance strategies are
particularly well-suited to rapidly developing technologies that demand an iterative,
incremental, and flexible regulatory approach. That said, discretionary use of
guidance that goes unchecked threatens to exceed the authority delegated to the
agency by Congress. Guidance documents that contravene the Agency’s statutory
mandate to promote public health chill innovation, delay the entry of helpful
products, or allow the use of harmful technologies. This essay advocates for a broader
conception of finality for the purposes of determining the reviewability of an agency
action. Rather than set aside the guidance document as invalid for procedural failures
(i.e. non-compliance with APA notice-and-comment provisions), courts ought to
adjudicate the merits. This approach is limited to guidance documents that purport
to bind the agency because only those guidance documents limit agency discretion,
and promote uniformity and predictable regulation. Allowing courts to proceed to
merits review will preserve the discretion the FDA needs to respond to the challenges
of rapidly developing technology.

